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The Dutch Paradox
The Impact of the Pan- European General Principles of Good 
Administration in the Netherlands
Janneke Gerards, Frank van Ommeren, and Johan Wolswinkel
I. Introduction
1. General Issues: The Netherlands and the CoE
The Netherlands is one of the founding fathers of the Council of Europe (CoE). Indeed, a 
congress in The Hague in 1948 formed an important basis for its establishment.1 Currently, 
the Netherlands is a signatory to 171 of the 223 treaties, protocols, and conventions that 
have been drafted within the CoE’s framework and it has ratified 160 of these (cf. M. 7.26).
Thus, the CoE would seem to be very important for the Netherlands. In practice this is 
certainly true for the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), but the impact of other CoE Conventions and soft law 
on Dutch law is highly diverse. In some areas the impact is significant. In social security 
and migration case law, legislation, and policy, for example, much attention is paid to the 
findings of the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) regarding the right to min-
imum subsistence and housing of persons illegally staying in the Netherlands (cf. MN. 7.76 
et seq.).2 By contrast, only few references are made to CoE documents in case law on envir-
onmental or planning issues.3
In yet other areas of administrative law the influence is limited to very specific topics. For ex-
ample, in relation to measures to protect women against domestic violence or exploitation, 
mention is sometimes made of the CoE’s Convention on preventing and combating vio-
lence against women and domestic violence (cf. MN. 1.56).4 In relation to a bill on compul-
sory care for persons of unsound mind the government paid attention to Recommendation 
 1 N. Weiß, ‘Origin and further development’ in S. Schmahl and M. Breuer (eds.), The Council of Europe— Its Law 
and Policies (2017), pp. 3– 22 (MN. 1.14 et seq.). The Netherlands signed the SCoE on 5 May 1949 and ratified it on 
5 August 1949, which also was the day the SCoE entered into force.
 2 See in detail in J.H. Gerards, ‘De rechtskracht van niet- bindende uitspraken van verdragscomités op het 
terrein van de grondrechten’ in J.H. Gerards, B. J. Schueler, M. W. Scheltema, and A. R. Neerhof (eds.), Hybride 
bestuursrecht (2017), pp. 11– 85.
 3 e.g., ABRvS 30 June 2010, ECLI:NL:RVS:2010:BM9701; ABRvS 9 October 2013, ECLI:NL:RVS:2013:1454.
 4 e.g., ABRvS 11 January 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:19; see also, e.g., the Explanatory Memorandum to a bill to 
regulate prostitution and combat abuses in the sex industry (Kamerstukken II 2013/ 14, 33885, No. 3).
Janneke Gerards, Frank van Ommeren, and Johan Wolswinkel, The Dutch Paradox: The Impact of the Pan- European General Principles of Good 
Administration in the Netherlands In: Good Administration and the Council of Europe: Law, Principles, and Effectiveness. Edited by: Ulrich Stelkens 





Rec(2004)10 of the Committee of Ministers of the CoE concerning the protection of the 
human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorders.5 Further, in its explanatory 
memorandum accompanying a bill on anti- doping policy and the establishment of an anti- 
doping authority, the government mentioned the CoE’s Anti- Doping Convention.6
Finally, with regard to transversal issues of administrative law, the impact of CoE docu-
ments seems to be rather marginal. As for the mayor codifications of general administra-
tive law (MN. 7.10 et seq.), parliamentary documents contain hardly any references to 
CoE documents. However, some references in parliamentary documents, e.g. to the CM 
Recommendation No. R (91) 1 on administrative sanctions (cf. MN. 1.65) and the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (cf. MN. 1.56), indicate that attention to the 
CoE is not totally absent when adopting general rules of administrative law in legislation 
(cf. MN. 7.50 et seq.).
Hence, the impact on Dutch administrative law of the CoE’s work appears to be rather 
uneven. No systematic studies have been undertaken that can help explain this ‘Dutch 
paradox’ but it is likely to be due to the sheer number of international instruments the 
Netherlands subscribes to; unavoidably this will have the effect of watering down the im-
pact of individual CoE instruments. Moreover, in several areas where the CoE documents 
might be of considerable importance, other international instruments have proven to be 
more attractive to Dutch legal practice.
EU law often dominates legislation and case law, but the ECHR also plays an all- important 
role.7 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has developed a coherent and readily 
accessible body of case law in nearly all areas of administrative law, varying from migration 
law and environmental law to social security law and administrative procedure. It turns 
out that most lawyers find it easier to concentrate on this case law than to try to find a 
way through the labyrinth of other CoE Conventions and (non- binding) soft law. Indeed, 
ECtHR judgments are closely followed by nearly all Dutch lawyers. ECtHR case law forms 
an inherent part of the curriculum at law schools as well as of professional training; most 
law journals regularly report on new developments ‘in Strasbourg’. ECtHR judgments are 
routinely referred to in court briefs, judgments, administrative decisions, policy docu-
ments, municipal by- laws, explanatory memoranda, and parliamentary debates. For the 
great majority of lawyers it seems that the CoE simply is the ECHR, and institutions such as 
the CM and the Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE (PACE) are there merely to support the 
ECtHR’s work and supervise the execution and implementation of its judgments.
 5 See e.g., the Explanatory Memorandum (memorie van toelichting) (Kamerstukken II 2009/ 10, 32399, No. 3).
 6 CETS No. 135 (which incidentally already entered into force for the Netherlands in 1995); Kamerstukken II 
2015/ 16, 34543 No. 3.
 7 See elaborately M. Claes and J. H. Gerards, ‘National report— The Netherlands’ in J. Laffranque (ed.), The 
Protection of Fundamental Rights Post- Lisbon: The Interaction between the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, the European Convention on Human Rights and National Constitutions, Reports of the XXV FIDE 
Congress Tallinn, Vol 1 (2012), pp. 613– 77; J. H. Gerards and C. Sieburgh (eds.), De invloed van fundamentele 
rechten op het materiële recht (2013); J. H. Gerards and J. W. A. Fleuren, ‘The Netherlands’ in J. H. Gerards and 
J. W. A. Fleuren (eds.), Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights and of the judgments of the 
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2. Methodology and Set- Up of the Chapter
Against the background of this first impression the main question to be discussed in this 
chapter is to what extent and how the pan- European general principles of good admin-
istration influence Dutch administrative law, in particular as compared to the principles 
following from the case law of the ECtHR. To obtain sufficient data to answer this question 
we have conducted quick scans using a number of major databases. To trace the impact of 
the CoE’s conventions and soft law on Dutch case law we have searched the database www.
rechtspraak.nl, on which almost all relevant Dutch case law since 2000 is published full- text. 
We have searched for the period 1 July 2007 to 1 July 2017, selecting only the judgments of 
the highest administrative courts and looking for hits on terms like ‘Council of Europe’ 
(Raad van Europa), ‘Parliamentary Assembly’ (Parlementaire Vergadering/ Assemblee) and 
‘Committee of Ministers’ (Comité van Ministers). We have made similar searches for le-
gislation and parliamentary documents (albeit for a shorter period, from 1 July 2015 until 
1 July 2017)  via the database www.officielebekendmakingen.nl. This database contains 
full- text versions of all Dutch legislation (both Acts of Parliament and lower legislation, 
such as government decrees) and all parliamentary documents, ranging from explanatory 
memoranda to parliamentary questions and transcripts of parliamentary deliberations. 
Finally, we have made searches for the relevant ombudsprudence via the database www.
nationaleombudsman.nl, using similar search terms to those mentioned above. We have 
analysed the documents obtained through these searches (about 250 for case law, about 300 
for legislation and parliamentary documents) for the nature and relevance of the references 
made. We have supplemented the quick scan with a study of literature on the impact of the 
ECHR on Dutch law, which in the Netherlands is a widely researched subject. Since this al-
lowed us to rely on recent and relevant research data we have conducted no further research 
into primary sources relating to the impact of the ECHR.
The results of our analyses are presented hereafter. We start with a short characterization of 
Dutch administrative law (MN. 7.09 et seq.) and a general description of the effect of inter-
national treaties and binding and non- binding decisions of international organizations in 
the Dutch legal system (cf. MN. 7.26 et seq.). Having clarified this we explain the ‘Dutch 
paradox’ by discussing the actual impact of the pan- European principles through legislation 
and case law (MN. 7.33 et seq.). We do so by first presenting how principles of good admin-
istration impact Dutch administrative law through application of the ECHR. To facilitate 
comparison we then present four case studies (MN. 7.49 et seq.) which show how and to 
what degree legislation and case law are influenced by CoE law other than the ECHR: CoE 
Conventions, CoE soft- law instruments and non- binding decisions, and other European 
law sources (EU law, judgments of the ECtHR). These four case studies are the European 
Charter of Local Self- Government, the CoE Convention on Access to Official Documents, 
the CoE Convention on Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of 
Personal Data, and decisions of the ECSR regarding the rights of undocumented aliens. In 
addition we briefly address the question of whether and to what extent Dutch courts may 
rely on non- binding CoE documents given a lack of a binding legal basis in either Dutch 
law or the ECHR (MN. 7.83 et seq.). We also set out whether other institutions— such as the 
National Ombudsperson— might play a role in giving shape to principles of good adminis-




Finally, we present a number of conclusions which can be derived from these analyses on 
the role that pan- European principles of good administration play in Dutch administrative 
law (MN. 7.91 et seq.).
II. Dutch Administrative Law in a Nutshell
1. A Separate Field of Law
To obtain a profound understanding of the possible added value of CoE instruments to 
Dutch administrative law, it is necessary to start with a short characterization of Dutch ad-
ministrative law. As in many European countries, administrative law in the Netherlands is 
a relatively young field of law. Although there are some important predecessors, this part of 
law really came into force after World War II, when the welfare state came into being and the 
role of the government changed rapidly. These changes brought along an important growth 
of legislation with a strong instrumental character. At the same time this new branch of 
statutory law gave rise to the development of a separate branch of courts of law that had to 
provide judicial protection against the administrative decisions based on these acts: the ad-
ministrative courts. This culminated in the establishment of the first general administrative 
court in 1976 (Arob- rechter).
Presently the Netherlands has a full- fledged body of general administrative law which is 
conceived of as a separate part of law, i.e., apart from private law. Dutch administrative law 
does not only consist of a multitude of specific administrative law statutes— which con-
cern many administrative fields of law (e.g. migration law, housing law, environmental law, 
planning law, law of telecommunications, etc.)— but also includes some statutes containing 
general rules of administrative law. Within this set of general legislation on administrative 
law the General Administrative Law Act (Algemene wet bestuursrecht— Awb) is not the only 
one8 but without doubt the most important piece of legislation in the field (cf. MN. 7.19). 
This act, which intends to cover the field of administrative law as whole, contains both a 
sizeable part of substantive law and procedural provisions for judicial protection.9
Due to its fragmentary development, the Dutch system of legal protection currently has 
a rather complex system of administrative courts, especially at the level of appeal. For the 
purposes of this study it suffices to state that there are four administrative courts of last re-
sort: the Administrative Law Division of the Council of State (Afdeling bestuursrechtspraak 
van de Raad van State— ABRvS), with a rather general jurisdiction over administrative law 
cases, the Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad van Beroep— CRvB) for civil service and 
social security cases, the Trade and Industry Appeals Tribunal (College van Beroep voor het 
bedrijfsleven— CBb) for administrative law cases of an economic nature, and the Supreme 
Court (Hoge Raad der Nederlanden— HR) for tax law cases.10
 8 On the relationship between the Algemene wet bestuursrecht and the Wet openbaarheid van bestuur, see 
MN. 7.59.
 9 See on the General Administrative Law Act:  T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden, and Y.E. Schuurmans, 
‘Netherlands’ in J.- B. Auby (ed.), Codification of Administrative Procedure (2014), pp. 253– 76.
 10 See:  R. Seerden and F. Stroink, ‘Administrative Law in the Netherlands’ in R. J.  G. H. Seerden (ed.), 
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Recently, much attention has been paid to cooperation between these four administrative 
courts. Apart from informal cooperation the introduction of two new mechanisms in 2014 
illustrate the importance attached to issues in the development and unity of (case) law: the 
office of Advocates- General for administrative law for the highest administrative courts, 
and the possibility of deciding in a ‘grand chamber’ with members of different highest 
administrative courts.11 Advocates- General can be asked by the ABRvS to provide non- 
binding opinions, like EU Advocates- General. There are presently two Advocates- General 
for administrative law. These new mechanisms have already delivered a firm contribution 
to the development of administrative law, including the general principles of administrative 
law and of good administration.
The task of the administrative courts is to provide judicial protection against a whole range 
of governmental actions by applying the substantive and procedural administrative law le-
gislation and other principles and rules of administrative law. The administrative courts, 
however, do not cover the whole area of administrative law. In addition to the administra-
tive courts the civil courts (including the civil court of last resort, the Hoge Raad) offer judi-
cial protection against governmental actions and omissions. The civil courts are especially 
important in the fields of public contract law12 and public liability law.13 Apart from these 
fields the civil courts have a general residual competence: the civil courts are competent in 
cases where there is no competence for an administrative court. In this way there is always a 
competent court to fill the gaps in judicial protection against government actions.14
Thus, the emergence of the general principles of administrative law can only be understood 
if due account is taken of the role of the Hoge Raad. Indeed, a typical characteristic of Dutch 
administrative law is that the civil courts apply acts and laws of a public or administrative 
law nature.15 This explains why traditionally the Hoge Raad has been an important actor in 
the development of public law and administrative law rules and principles. To a lesser extent 
it still performs this function today.
2. General Principles of Administrative Law and 
of Good Administration
For the purposes of assessing the impact of the pan- European general principles of good 
administration on Dutch administrative law it is necessary to pay attention to the specific 
role of general principles of administrative law. The development of general legal principles 
in the Dutch legal system is a time- consuming process. It can take many years, even dec-
ades, before a new legal principle is fully acknowledged as part of the legal system. The 
 11 The tax law chamber of the HR had the office of an attorney- general already long before.
 12 F. van Ommeren, P. Huisman. and C. Jansen, ‘Judicial and extra- judicial protection regarding public con-
tracts in the Netherlands’ in L. Folliot- Lalliot and S. Torricelli (eds.), Administrative oversight and judicial protec-
tion for public contracts (2017), pp. 157– 81.
 13 C. van Dam, ‘Liability of Public Authorities in the Netherlands’ in D. Fairgrieve, M. Andenas, and J. Bell 
(eds.), Tort Liability of Public Authorities in Comparative Perspective (2002), pp. 559– 69.
 14 HR 31 december 1915, NJ 1916, 416 (Guldemond/ Noordwijkerhout); G. Jurgens and F. van Ommeren, ‘The 
Public- Private Divide in English and Dutch Law: a Multifunctional and Context- Dependent Divide’, (2012) 71 
Cambridge Law Journal, pp. 172– 99 (pp. 181 et seq.).







courts have always played and still play an important role in this process. This may seem 
surprising because the Dutch legal system, as a continental law system, typically belongs 
to the civil law systems. However, case law still has a certain degree of precedential effect. 
The courts take earlier judgments seriously into account, although they are empowered to 
modulate previous judgments when in their opinion the circumstances force them to de-
cide so. By doing so they can gradually build a certain set of well- established notions or in-
terpretations, including certain general principles of administrative law.
For the purposes of assessing the impact of CoE law it is worth emphasizing that the courts 
have not derived the Dutch general principles of administrative law from constitutional 
principles nor do they have other sources in the Netherlands Constitution (Grondwet— 
Gw);16 the only exception is the principle of equality, which is codified in Article 1 Gw. In 
fact, the general principles mostly originate from public liability law and general adminis-
trative statutory law.
Chronologically, the development of the general principles of administrative law made a 
modest start before World War II in the civil service case law of the CRvB and in the public 
liability case law of the Hoge Raad. This transformative development took place not only in 
the civil courts but also in the administrative courts, especially after World War II. It was 
led and inspired by legal scholars such as Wiarda, who became president of the ECtHR 
(1981– 85).17
The most important general principles of administrative law currently crystallized in the 
case law are the prohibition of ultra vires acts by the administrative bodies, the prohibition 
of détournement de pouvoir, the prohibition of arbitrariness, the principle of equality, the 
principle of legal certainty, the principle of legitimate expectations, the principle of propor-
tionality, the principle of due care, and the duty to state reasons. These general principles of 
administrative law do not constitute a fixed set of norms; the process of finding new general 
principles of administrative law through case law is still ongoing, just like the refinement 
and modification of their legal meaning.
Due to their background in case law the general principles of administrative law were gen-
erally considered to form part of ‘unwritten’ law, which means that they are not laid down 
in the ‘written’ law of treaties, statutes, decrees, etc. This is still partly true. However, a mile-
stone in their development is their partial codification in the Awb (cf. MN. 7.10) in 1994. 
Some of the general principles of administrative law, like the principle of due care and the 
duty to state reasons, are elaborated in various specific and very detailed rules in the Awb.18 
Other general principles of administrative law, like the principle of proportionality, are co-
dified in the Awb only in general terms.19
 16 For a short characterization of the Grondwet as ‘unostentatious, simple, sober and short’ see L. Besselink and 
M. Claes, ‘The Netherlands: The Pragmatics of a Flexible, Europeanised Constitution’ in A. Albi and S. Bardutzky 
(eds.), National Constitutions in European and Global Governance: Democracy, Rights, the Rule of Law (2019), pp. 
179– 220 (pp. 182 et seq.).
 17 See in more detail: P. Nicolaï, Beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur (1990), pp. 79 et seq.
 18 See for the principle of due care: Article 3:2, 3:4 (1) and many articles of  chapter 4 Awb– a few will be men-
tioned hereafter; see for the duty to state reasons: Article 3:46- 3:50 Awb.
 19 Article 3:4 (2) Awb. On this principle, refer to J. H. Gerards, ‘Het evenredigheidsbeginsel van art. 3:4 lid 2 Awb 
en het Europese recht’ in T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden, and E. Steyger (eds.), Europees recht effectueren. Algemeen 





216 Gerards, van Ommeren, and Wolswinkel
In addition to the Awb there is other legislation in which general principles of administra-
tive law have been codified. Next to Article 1 Gw,20 which contains the equality principle, 
reference can be made to the duty to state reasons, which is also laid down in the Public 
Procurement Act 2012 (Aanbestedingswet 2012).21 Many aspects of the principle of due care 
are furthermore elaborated in various sector- specific administrative acts which contain 
provisions for specific social or economic areas.
A related, very important, feature of administrative law is that even after codification of (cer-
tain elements of) a principle of administrative law the principle does not lose its meaning 
as an unwritten general legal principle. This is because codification in a statutory act very 
rarely covers the general principle completely. Moreover, unwritten general principles of 
administrative law have never lost their relevance simply because some of them have not 
been codified in statutory law at all. The principle of legitimate expectations, for instance, 
has never been laid down in administrative law legislation because its scope and force are 
considered to be too broad and too vague. This emphasizes the ongoing importance of con-
ceiving the general principles of administrative law as a body of unwritten law too. Finally, 
it is worth mentioning that courts use statutory law and case law to ‘recognize’ the develop-
ment of a new legal principle, as well as recommendations, comments, and statements of 
other national and international legal actors.
A very recent step in the development of Dutch administrative law is the acknowledgement 
of general principles that are not a clear and distinct part of the law but play an important 
role in day- to- day administrative practice. These principles are designated as principles of 
good administration or good governance.22 This is an open category of principles and values. 
Often- mentioned examples in literature are the principle of openness, the principle of in-
tegrity, the principle of fairness, the principle of participation, the principle of account-
ability, and the principle of effectiveness. Another value that is an integrated part of good 
governance is the idea of responsiveness of the administration.23 The principles of good ad-
ministration are often part of (non- binding) policy rules, codes of governance,24 and other 
pieces of soft law.
It is important to emphasize the difference between the general principles of administra-
tive law and these general principles of good administration in Dutch law. It goes without 
saying that the general principles of administrative law are part of the law. By contrast the 
general principles of good administration are not a real part of the law. This means that 
 20 J. H. Gerards, Judicial Review in Equal Treatment Cases (2005).
 21 Article 1.4 (3) Aanbestedingswet 2012. On the relationship between the general principles of administrative 
law and the Aanbestedingswet 2012: M. Scheltema, ‘De nieuwe Aanbestedingswet: een duurzaam bouwwerk?’ in 
Beschouwingen naar aanleiding van het wetsvoorstel Aanbestedingswet (2010), pp. 123– 53 (pp. 127– 31).
 22 See elaborately H. Addink, Good Governance— Concept and Context (2019), p. 19 and pp. 99– 182.
 23 G. H. Addink, ‘Algemene beginselen van goed bestuur en de toepassing daarvan door de Algemene 
Rekenkamer’, (2005) 23 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Bestuursrecht, pp. 169– 83 (pp. 169 et seq.); G. H. Addink, ‘Het 
concept van ‘goed bestuur’ in het bestuursrecht en de praktische consequenties daarvan’, (2012) 4 Ars Aequi, pp. 
266– 75 (pp. 266 et seq.).
 24 Inter alia J. W. J. Besemer, ‘Horizontaal verantwoorden’, (2007) 28 Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Bestuursrecht, 
pp. 195– 203 (pp. 195 et seq.), about the ‘Handvest Publieke Verantwoording’ see C. H. C. Overes, ‘De stichting 
en governance: bestuur en toezicht’ in M. L. Lennarts, W. J. M. van Veen, and D. F. M. M. Zaman (eds.), De 
stichting (2011), pp. 61– 81 (pp. 72– 74); F. J. van Ommeren, ‘De betekenis van de governancebenadering voor het 
onderscheid tussen publiek— en privaatrecht’ in C. H. C. Overes and W. J. M. van Veen (eds.), Met recht betrokken. 






the general principles of administrative law and the general principles of good administra-
tion strongly differ in legal force. The general principles of administrative law have a very 
high legal status.25 Most official decisions by the administration are amenable to annulment 
when they infringe a principle of administrative law: not only individual decisions but also 
subordinate legislation have to meet the requirements of the general principles of adminis-
trative law. If a general principle of administrative law is violated by an administrative de-
cision the decision is legally invalid. By contrast the principles of good administration are, 
legally speaking, non- binding principles. If the administration does not comply with a gen-
eral principle of good administration this behaviour is objectionable from the viewpoint of 
good governance but is not considered to be illegal. A classic example is a decision by the 
administration that turns out to be ineffective: although such a decision violates the general 
principle of effectiveness the administrative body does not breach the law by taking it.
Potentially, a general principle of good administration can transform into a general prin-
ciple of administrative law over time. A general principle that is currently situated on the 
edge of the sphere of good administration and the sphere of general administrative law 
would be the principle of transparency (cf. MN. 7.98). At the moment this principle is 
still not fully recognized as a principle of good administration in administrative law case 
law,26 possibly because the courts cannot oversee in advance all the possible consequences 
that would result from acknowledging a binding general legal principle of transparency.27 
Therefore, as the law currently stands, such a principle of good governance could transform 
into a general principle of administrative law only if the legislature were to codify it as a legal 
principle.28
While administrative courts do not play a dominant role in the development of the prin-
ciples of good administration some other authorities in the Netherlands are equipped to 
develop and apply these principles. This holds in particular for the National Ombudsperson 
(Nationale Ombudsman) and the National Court of Audit (Algemene Rekenkamer). Since 
the opinions of the National Ombudsperson are legally non- binding and do not establish 
real legal precedents the Ombudsperson has the opportunity to elaborate the principles of 
good administration without worrying about their legal consequences (cf. MN. 7.89). Also, 
for an institution like the Algemene Rekenkamer it is relatively easy to contribute to devel-
oping the principles of good administration. Since its primary task is to control the expend-
iture of the national government the Algemene Rekenkamer is, rather more than a court 
of law, focused on the accountability and effectiveness of administrative actions. When 
evaluating the propriety (instead of the lawfulness) of administrative behaviour it does not 
need to be much concerned about whether these principles are legally binding.
 25 As confirmed very recently in No 6.11 of the opinion of the A- G: ECLI:NL:NL:RVS:2016:1421. See also: R. 
Widdershoven, ‘Een ervaring als staatsraad advocaat- generaal: op zoek naar een rechtsbeginsel’ in M. Bosma, 
B. J. van Ettekoven, O. van Loon, H. Lubberdink, J. de Poorte, and B. Schueler (eds.), De conclusie voorbij. Liber 
amicorum aangeboden aan Jaap Polak (2017), pp. 87– 101 (pp. 91, 92).
 26 See C. J. Wolswinkel, De verdeling van schaarse publiekrechtelijke rechten. Op zoek naar algemene regels van 
verdelingsrecht (2013), pp. 307 et seq.; A. Drahmann, Transparante en eerlijke verdeling van schaarse besluiten 
(2015), pp. 317 et seq., C. J. Wolswinkel, ‘Concession Meets Authorisation’, (2017) European Public Procurement 
Law Review, pp. 396– 407.
 27 F.J. van Ommeren, ‘Schaarse vergunningen: het beginsel van gelijke kansen als rechtsgrondslag’ in Bosma, 
van Ettekoven, van Loon, Lubberdink, de Poorte, and Schueler (n. 25), pp. 191– 208 (pp. 196– 98).
 28 Widdershoven (n. 25), p. 92.
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III. Reception of the Pan- European General Principles 
of Good Administration through Ratifying CoE Conventions
1. Legal Status of Rules of International Law and their Place 
in the Hierarchy of Norms
As already mentioned the Netherlands is a signatory to 171 CoE Conventions, of which 
it has ratified 160 (cf. MN. 1.06). The eagerness of the Netherlands to accept most CoE 
Conventions is in line with its traditional openness to international law. Ever since its art-
icles on foreign relations were significantly amended in 1953, the Grondwet has opened 
with the constitutional duty of the Government to promote the development of the inter-
national legal order (Article 90 Gw).29 Rules of international law (treaties, resolutions of 
international organizations, rules of customary international law) are part of the law of the 
land as soon as they have become binding on the Netherlands (Article 93 Gw).
Moreover, as may be inferred from the Grondwet (cf. MN. 7.29), law of domestic origin is 
subordinate to rules of international law. In the Kingdom of the Netherlands international 
law outranks national legal rules in the hierarchy of law, including the Constitution and (it 
must be assumed) the Charter for the Kingdom.30 However, the power of the courts to dis-
apply the Grondwet, Acts of Parliament, and subordinate legislation in cases where applica-
tion would be inconsistent with rules of international law is restricted to those rules that are 
embodied in self- executing provisions of treaty law31 (cf. MN. 7.30 et seq.).
Although Article 94 Gw specifically provides for the remedy of disapplication of legislation 
that is incompatible with self- executing rules of international law, in practice this is only 
one of the methods or techniques used by courts. Indeed, in most cases, the Dutch courts 
aim to apply and construe national law in such a way that violation of international law is 
avoided by ‘verdragsconforme interpretatie’ (‘treaty conform interpretation’ or ‘harmonious 
interpretation’).32
2. Self- Executing Provisions of Treaty Law
Since the concept of a self- executing provision of treaty law plays a vital role in the relation-
ship between Dutch law and international law, including CoE instruments, it may be useful 
 29 For an analysis of this provision see L. F. M. Besselink, ‘The Constitutional Duty to Promote the Development 
of the International Legal Order: The Significance and Meaning of Article 90 of the Netherlands Constitution’, 
(2003) 34 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, pp. 89– 138.
 30 J. G. Brouwer, ‘The Netherlands’ in D. B. Hollis, M. Blakeslee, and B. Ederington (eds.), National Treaty 
Law and Practice (2005), pp. 482– 536 (pp. 482, 498– 99); J. W. A. Fleuren, Een ieder verbindende bepalingen van 
verdragen (2004), pp. 338– 40.
 31 See, e.g., HR 18 September 2001, ECLI:NL:HR:2001:AB1471 (for a translation in English see ILDC 80 (NL 
2001); HR 8 July 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BC7418 (for a translation in English see ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BG1476).
 32 HR 16 November 1990, ECLI:NL:HR:1990:ZC0044. See also J. de Wit, Artikel 94 Grondwet toegepast. Een 
onderzoek naar de betekenis, de bedoeling en de toepassing van de woorden ‘vinden geen toepassing’ in artikel 94 van 
de Grondwet (2012). For an extensive discussion of case law, see J. W. A. Fleuren, ‘Directe en indirecte toepassing 
van internationaal recht door de Nederlandse rechter’, (2005) 131 Mededelingen van de Nederlandse Vereniging 






to explain briefly the Dutch approach to defining the notion of self- executing provisions. 
According to Article 93 Gw:
Provisions of treaties and of resolutions by international institutions which may be binding 
on all persons by virtue of their contents, shall become binding after they have been 
published.
This means that these provisions shall have force of law in regard to all natural and legal per-
sons after they have been published. As soon as such provisions have become binding on all 
persons they may prevent the application of national legislation (Article 94 Gw).
Currently, according to the Hoge Raad, the question of whether or not the contracting par-
ties intended a provision of treaty law to be self- executing (i.e., to have direct effect) is only 
relevant when they either clearly wanted the provision to have a direct effect, or, on the con-
trary, when they clearly agreed that no such direct effect should be given.33 Except for this 
situation the content of the provision is decisive. The accepted standard is that there is no 
direct effect if the provision entails an obligation on the Dutch legislature to adopt statutory 
regulations along the lines indicated by the provision. If the provision can in itself operate 
as law (‘objectief recht’) within the domestic legal order, direct effect is accepted. It might be 
inferred from a 2011 judgment of the Hoge Raad that this will be the case if the provision is 
unconditional and sufficiently precise to be applied by the courts.34
3. Prohibition of Constitutional Review of Acts of Parliament
To understand the major role of international law in Dutch administrative law it is also im-
portant to note that under Article 120 Gw courts are prohibited from reviewing the consti-
tutionality of Acts of Parliament and there is no constitutional court. The power of courts to 
review legislation for compatibility with the Grondwet as well as fundamental principles of 
law is limited to administrative decisions as well as subordinate legislation such as govern-
ment decrees, ministerial decrees, provincial and municipal regulations, and by- laws.
For a variety of reasons, however, it is rather uncommon to review even such administra-
tive decisions and subordinate legislation for their compatibility with the Grondwet. Most 
importantly, the provisions of the Grondwet have not been written with their application 
in judicial procedures in mind— for example, most fundamental rights provisions merely 
determine the competence to regulate the exercise of these rights without offering any 
substantive standards on how this should be done.35 Since such standards and criteria are 
readily available in international treaties (in particular the ECHR, cf. MN. 7.33 et seq.), 
which have direct effect and priority anyway, many lawyers and judges have developed the 
habit of referring to rules of international law instead of constitutional provisions.36
 33 HR 30 May 1986, ECLI:NL:HR:1986:AC9402 (for a translation in English see 18 NYIL (1987), p. 389); HR 18 
April 1995, ECLI:NL:HR:1995:AD4656.
 34 HR 1 April 2011, ECLI:NL:HR:2011:BP3044.
 35 J. H. Gerards, ‘Oordelen over grondrechten– rechtsvinding door de drie hoogste rechters in Nederland’ in H. 
den Tonkelaar and L. de Groot (eds.), Rechtsvinding op veertien terreinen (2012), pp. 9– 51.
 36 Besselink and Claes (n. 16), p. 183 et seq. This is true in particular for cases about fundamental rights issues; 
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IV. Reception of the Pan- European General Principles of Good 
Administration through the Application of the ECHR
1. Legal Status of the ECHR in the Netherlands
The Netherlands was one of the first states to sign and ratify the ECHR on 4 November 1950 
in Rome. However, it did not manage to finish the process of parliamentary approval in time 
to belong to the group of states who became a party to the ECHR on the date of its entering 
into force, i.e. 3 September 1953. Instead the ECHR, together with its Protocol No. 1, en-
tered into force for the Netherlands on 31 August 1954.37 At first the government hesitated 
as to whether it should accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR— some argued it 
would be enough that, according to the Grondwet, alleged victims could invoke the ECHR 
before the Dutch courts.38 Nevertheless, on 5 July 1960 both the right of individuals to com-
plain in ‘Strasbourg’ and the compulsory jurisdiction of the ECtHR were finally recognized 
by the Netherlands.39
The Netherlands has become a party to all the Protocols to the ECHR except for Protocol 
No. 7, which it has never ratified. In 2004 the responsible ministers explained that the gov-
ernment objected to a general right to appeal in criminal cases as laid down in Article 2 of 
Protocol No. 7.40 It was important to retain sufficient flexibility for not granting an appeal, 
for instance in cases of light criminal offences, especially because of considerations of expe-
diency. If appeals would have to be allowed in all such cases this would be time- consuming 
and could endanger another right granted by the ECHR, i.e., the right to a trial within a 
reasonable time.
The substantive provisions of the ECHR and the Protocols to which the Netherlands is 
a party are considered by the courts to be ‘binding on all persons’ within the meaning of 
Articles 93 and 94 Gw. In other words they are self- executing or have direct effect.41 In the 
past the courts used to rule that Article 13 ECHR lacked direct effect42 but this case law is 
outdated.43
2. Overall Impact of the ECHR on Dutch Administrative Law
Until the end of the 1970s the ECHR had little impact on Dutch administrative law.44 In the 
1980s, however, this changed rapidly. The ECtHR’s case law thereafter had a particular im-
pact on administrative law. The judgments of the ECtHR on effective remedies in relation to 
 37 Trb 1954, 151.
 38 Y. S. Klerk and L. van Poelgeest, ‘Ratificatie à contre coeur: de reserves van de Nederlandse regering jegens 
het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens en het individueel klachtrecht’, (1991) Rechtsgeleerd Magazijn 
Themis, pp. 220– 46.
 39 Trb 1961, 8.
 40 Letter of the Minister of Justice to the Parliament, Kamerstukken II 2004/ 05, 29 800 VI, No. 9.
 41 See further J. W.  A. Fleuren, ‘The application of public international law by Dutch courts’, (2010) 57 
Netherlands International Law Review, pp. 245– 66 (p. 245).
 42 e.g., HR 18 February 1986, ECLI:NL:HR:1986:AC9229; ARRS 26 July 1983, ECLI:NL:RVS:1983:AM7262.
 43 See, e.g., ABRvS 9 June 1994, ECLI:NL:RVS:1994:AN4196.
 44 For an overview of the older Dutch case law on the ECHR and other human rights treaties see A. W. Heringa 






sanctions, starting with Engel45 and Öztürk,46 made it clear that certain disciplinary admin-
istrative law penalties had to be regarded as ‘criminal charges’ (cf. MN. 1.46) and, accord-
ingly, their imposition should comply with the requirements of Articles 5 and 6 ECHR.47 
Similarly, the judgments in Ringeisen48 and König49 showed that Article 6 (1) ECHR under 
its civil heading applied to certain administrative law issues (cf. MN. 1.45). This was all the 
more important for the Netherlands as the ECtHR had held in its Golder judgment that 
Article 6 ECHR implied an individual right to access to a court.50 The Netherlands admin-
istrative law system at the time hardly provided for such access. Instead, it mainly provided 
for review of administrative law acts by higher administrative bodies (administratief beroep) 
with the Crown (Kroon)— the central government— as the highest instance.
In 1985 the landmark case of Benthem51 made it abundantly clear that this system could no 
longer be sustained without violating Article 6 ECHR since it did not provide for individual 
legal protection by an independent and impartial court.52 This judgment led to a complete 
overhaul of Dutch administrative law, culminating in the introduction of the Awb in 1994.53
Also, after the new system had come into effect, the ECtHR’s judgments continued to have 
an influence on the development of administrative law and administrative procedure in the 
Netherlands. For example, the judgments in Procola54 and Kleyn55 sparked an intense (as 
yet unfinished) debate on the objective impartiality of one of the high administrative courts 
in the Netherlands, the ABRvS, which forms part of the same Council of State that is also the 
highest advisory body for the legislature.56
Other examples of influence on Dutch administrative law are the systems for compensation 
in cases of delays in judicial proceedings which high administrative courts have introduced 
in response to judgments of the ECtHR,57 the discussions on the consequences of the case 
 45 Engels and Others v.  Netherlands (5100/ 71; 5101/ 71; 5102/ 71; 5354/ 72; 5370/ 72) 8 June 1976 ECtHR 
[Plenary].
 46 Öztürk v. Germany (8544/ 79) 21 October 1984 ECtHR [Plenary].
 47 See further, e.g., N. Verheij, ‘Onder dexel van politie. Het Nederlandse bestuursrecht onder het EVRM’ in A. 
W. Heringa, J. G. C. Schokkenbroek, and J. van der Velde (eds.), 40 Jaar Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de 
Mens. Opstellen over de ontwikkelingen van het EVRM in Straatsburg en in Nederland 1950– 1990 (1990), pp. 225– 
48 (p. 232).
 48 Ringeisen v. Austria (2614/ 65) 16 July 1971 ECtHR at [94].
 49 König v. Germany (6232/ 73) 28 June 1978 ECtHR [Plenary] at [88] et seq.
 50 Golder v. UK (4451/ 70) 21 February 1975 ECtHR [Plenary].
 51 Benthem v. Netherlands (8848/ 80) 23 October 1985 ECtHR [Plenary].
 52 The impact of this judgment became even clearer as a result of a later judgment which showed that Article 6 
ECHR did not only apply to concrete decisions but also to more general regulations such as municipal construc-
tion plans; see Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (10842/ 84) 25 October 1989 ECtHR.
 53 See Verheij (n. 47), pp. 225– 48 (p. 226 et seq.).
 54 Procola v. Luxembourg (14570/ 89) 28 September 1995 ECtHR.
 55 Kleyn and Others v. Netherlands (39343/ 98, 39651/ 98, 43147/ 98, 46664/ 99) 6 May 2003 ECtHR [GC].
 56 See, e.g., A. M.  L. Jansen, ‘Towards an Adjustment of the Trias Politica:  the Administrative Courts as 
(Procedural) Lawmaker; a Study of the Influence of the European Human Rights Convention and the Case Law 
by the European Court of Human Rights on the Trias Politica, in particular the Position of Dutch Administrative 
Courts in relation to the Administration’ in F. Stroink and E. van der Linden (eds.), Judicial Lawmaking and 
Administrative Law (2005), pp. 37– 55. In Dutch, with many references to relevant literature on the consequences 
of Procola, see T. Barkhuysen, M. L. van Emmerik, and J. P. Loof, ‘50 Jaar EVRM en het Nederlandse staats— en 
bestuursrecht— ontwikkelingen en vooruitzichten’ in R.A. Lawson and E. Myjer (eds.), 50 Jaar Europees Verdrag 
voor de Rechten van de Mens (2000), pp. 327– 408 (pp. 392 et seq).
 57 See, e.g., HR 17 June 2008, ECLI:NL:HR:2008:BD2578; ABRvS 26 March 2008, ECLI:NL:RVS:2008:BC7604; 
CRvB 23 January 2008, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2008:BC2942. See in more detail S. Jansen and C. Backes, ‘Faster and 
better? Decision- making in the Netherlands’ in C. Backes, M. Eliantonio, and S. Jansen (eds.), Quality and speed in 
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law of the ECtHR (and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)) on the ‘full 
jurisdiction’ requirement58 (cf. MN. 1.45), and the potential impact of the ECtHR’s new 
approach to the right to access to public documents59 (cf. MN. 1.48 et seq.) on Dutch legis-
lation and policy.60
These examples show a constant and direct impact of ECtHR case law on the development 
of Dutch general administrative law and administrative procedure,61 as well as of general 
principles of good governance.62 The ECtHR’s case law has also strongly influenced sub-
stantive administrative law, in particular in areas such as tax law, social security, migration 
law, and environmental and planning law.63 For example, a series of judgments starting with 
Öneryildiz64 caused many debates on protection of individuals against hazardous instal-
lations and on the question of how issues of regulation and supervision should be organ-
ized in such a way as to enable compliance with the positive obligations imposed by the 
ECtHR.65
Indeed, every Dutch lawyer is aware of the special meaning of the ECHR and its Protocols 
for virtually all areas of domestic law, including administrative law. Currently, judges and 
solicitors seem to be even more familiar with the rights entailed in the ECHR than with the 
rights embodied in the Grondwet,66 and the same appears to be true for lawyers working for 
legislative and administrative bodies.
3. Impact of the ECHR on Legislation (and Administrative Bodies)
According to Articles 93 and 94 Gw (cf. MN. 7.29 et seq.) the substantive provisions of 
the ECHR and the Protocols entail a right to observance of the ECHR by the State and 
 58 cf. Sigma Radio Television Ltd v.  Cyprus (32181/ 04 and 35122/ 05) 21 July 2011 ECtHR and Menarini 
Diagnostics v. Italy (43509/ 08) 27 September 2011 ECtHR. See further, e.g., C. Albers, ‘Bestraffend bestuur 2014. 
Naar een volwassen bestraffend bestuursrecht?’ and M.L. van Emmerik and C.M. Saris, ‘Evenredige bestuurlijke 
boetes’, both in Boetes en andere bestraffende sancties: een nieuw perspectief? (2014); J. H. Gerards, T. Barkhuysen, 
and M.L. van Emmerik, ‘De invloed van de Europese fundamentele rechten op het bestuursrecht’ in B. J. Schueler 
(ed.), Europeanisering van het algemeen bestuursrecht (2014), pp. 33– 56 (pp. 51 et seq.).
 59 Cf. Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary (37374/ 05) 14 April 2009 ECtHR and Magyar Helsinki Bizottság 
v. Hungary (18030/ 11) 8 November 2016 ECtHR [GC].
 60 See in response, e.g., ABRvS 22 February 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:498, AB 2017/ 147 (case note J. Tingen, 
with references to earlier case law); see also, e.g., A. Klingenberg, ‘Tijd voor verandering:  leidt de Wet Open 
Overheid tot meer openheid?’, (2017) 1 Ars Aequi, pp. 20– 24.
 61 This is well- documented; for general reviews, see, e.g., Barkhuysen, van Emmerik, and Loof (n. 56), pp. 382 
et seq.; A. M. L. Jansen, Constitutionalisering van het bestuursprocesrecht (2004); T. Barkhuysen and M.L. van 
Emmerik, ‘Het EVRM als inspiratiebron en correctiemechanisme voor de Awb’ in T. Barkhuysen, W. den Ouden, 
and J.E.M. Polak (eds.), 15 Jaar Awb: bestuursrecht harmoniseren (2010), pp. 557– 87; T. Barkhuysen and M. L. van 
Emmerik, ‘Mensenrechten als waarborg voor toegankelijk, zorgvuldig, voortvarend en evenredig bestuursrecht’, 
(2012) 2 JBPlus, pp. 180– 94; Gerards, Barkhuysen, and van Emmerik (n. 58), pp. 33– 56 (pp. 51 et seq.).
 62 See, e.g., Barkhuysen, van Emmerik, and Loof (n. 56), pp. 392 et seq, pp. 382 et seq.; Jansen (n. 61); J. H. 
Gerards, T.  Barkhuysen, and M.  L.  van Emmerik (n. 58), pp.  51 et seq.; see specifically also H. Addink, 
‘Algemene beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur in de Nederlandse en Europese rechtspraak’ in B. J. Schueler (ed.), 
Europeanisering van het algemeen bestuursrecht (2014), pp. 57– 73 (pp. 71– 73).
 63 This also has been well- documented; see, e.g., T. Barkhuysen, ‘Het EVRM als integraal onderdeel van het 
Nederlandse materiële bestuursrecht’ in De betekenis van het EVRM voor het materiële bestuursrecht (2004), 
pp. 7– 114.
 64 Öneryıldız v. Turkey (48939/ 99) 30 November 2004 ECtHR [GC].
 65 See generally, e.g., D. Sanderink, Het EVRM en het materiële omgevingsrecht (2015).





all its public bodies, including all legislative and administrative bodies. The Dutch legis-
lature actively strives to comply with the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR for all Acts 
of Parliament. The general guidelines for legislation expressly refer to the ECHR and the 
standards developed by the ECtHR,67 just like the various checklists that are used to guar-
antee the quality of legislation.68
National Ombudspersons and independent accountability agencies— such as the Data 
Protection Authority (Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens— AP) or the National Human Rights 
Institute (College voor de Rechten van de Mens)— also have the task of guaranteeing and 
supervising compliance with the ECHR by administrative and subordinate legislative 
bodies, but generally they do not regard this as their core business. Instead, when it is 
thought that a decision or a measure is not in conformity with the ECHR a case is usually 
brought before the Dutch administrative courts (or the civil courts if the legality of legisla-
tion is directly contested). Although references to the ECHR and underlying case law are 
certainly not absent in reports of the National Ombudsperson (e.g. with regard to freedom 
of demonstration) the impact of references to the ECHR for the development of issues of 
general administrative law seems limited. For that reason this section focuses on the role 
the Dutch administrative courts play in enforcing the ECHR and the principles of good ad-
ministration developed in the ECtHR’s case law.
4. Impact of the ECHR on Dutch Case Law
For the Dutch courts the ECHR is a very important instrument. As discussed above (cf. 
MN. 7.27 et seq.) the Grondwet allows the courts to apply the provisions of the ECHR dir-
ectly and obliges them to disapply Acts of Parliament (and even the Constitution) if this is 
necessary to avoid a violation of the ECHR.69 Nevertheless, there is no general legal obli-
gation for the Dutch administrative courts to apply the ECHR ex officio. In most cases the 
ECHR is only applied if the parties have referred to it (which they usually do). However, if 
a party has not expressly referred to the ECHR, but it is clear that an ECHR provision or an 
ECtHR precedent applies, the administrative courts may apply the ECHR of their own ac-
cord. In addition, the courts must apply the ECHR ex officio if ECtHR case law pertains to 
provisions that are of so- called ‘public order’ (openbare orde), which means that they relate 
to core provisions of administrative law. This is mainly relevant for provisions determining 
the courts’ competence to deal with a certain matter and provisions determining access to 
court, such as time limits and periods for appeal.
 67 General Guidelines for Legislation (Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving)— digital version at https:// www.kcwj.
nl/ kennisbank/ aanwijzingen- voor- de- regelgeving. See, e.g., Guideline 18 on the general need for compliance with 
higher norms; Guideline 139 on the choice for a punitive sanction mechanism; Guideline 166 on retroactive effect 
of legislation.
 68 See in particular the checklist ‘Review compliance (international) (classic) fundamental rights’ (Checklist 
toetsing (internationale) (klassieke) grondrechten), which is part of the ‘Integral consideration mechanism policy 
and legislation’ (Integraal afwegingskader beleid en regelgeving) at [6.2.1.] (https:// www.kcwj.nl/ kennisbank/ 
integraal- afwegingskader- beleid- en- regelgeving/ 6- wat- het- beste- instrument/ 62/ 621).
 69 If only for that reason the ECHR is often invoked before Dutch courts, even to such an extent that it has been 




224 Gerards, van Ommeren, and Wolswinkel
The Dutch courts usually strive to ensure that all legislation and administrative decisions 
are interpreted in harmony with the ECHR and the judgments of the ECtHR (cf. MN. 7.06). 
They generally do not distinguish between judgments against the Netherlands and judg-
ments rendered against other states but generally accept that all of the ECtHR’s precedents 
have interpretative force.70 As soon as a judgment is invoked by one of the parties and ap-
pears to be relevant for the Dutch situation, for example because it concerns a legal constel-
lation similar to one existing in Dutch law, it is taken into account.
As a consequence the Dutch courts frequently use the standards that have been developed 
by the ECtHR.71 For example, it is very common for the Dutch administrative courts to dir-
ectly apply the standards the ECtHR has developed in cases about environmental hazards, 
expulsion of aliens, or administrative law penalties.72 However, in quite a number of cases, 
the standards are slightly adjusted so as to provide for a better fit with traditional Dutch 
law concepts and norms. An example is the case law on special social assistance benefits 
(bijzondere bijstand) for illegal immigrants. In its first judgment on the issue the competent 
high administrative court, the CRvB, expressly referred to standards and criteria developed 
in the ECtHR’s judgments. In doing so, however, it adapted them a bit so as to construe a set 
of specialized criteria to meet the demands of the particular situation type.73 In subsequent 
judgments both the CRvB and the lower administrative courts have tended to refer only 
to this domestic precedent rather than to the underlying ECtHR judgment. Thus, Dutch 
courts use the ECtHR’s case law mainly to supplement, build, and refine their own sets of 
standards rather than applying the standards exactly as they have been formulated by the 
ECtHR.74
In relation to the general principles of administrative law it is even more difficult to measure 
the impact of the ECtHR’s case law. When applying these principles the starting point for 
Dutch courts is usually the carefully drafted provisions of the Awb. As already explained (cf. 
MN. 7.19 et seq.) these are often codifications of long- standing and well- established case 
law and doctrine combined with ECHR and EU influences as well as inspiration derived 
from foreign legal systems.
This practice also may have the effect that the standards or principles as applied in adminis-
trative law cases have a slightly different character and content as compared to the original 
ECHR standards. From an ECHR perspective this is not necessarily problematic since the 
ECtHR often leaves a certain margin of appreciation which offers sufficient flexibility to 
allow for such national typicalities.75 Only if the adapted standards clearly fall below the 
ECHR minimum may there be a risk that, eventually, an application will be successfully 
lodged at the ECtHR. Thus far, however, in the area of administrative law, such applications 
have been mainly made in relation to migration law issues and have been rarely successful.76
 70 See Gerards and Fleuren (n. 7), pp. 217– 60.
 71 See Claes and Gerards (n. 7), pp. 640– 42.
 72 See generally, with many examples and references: Gerards and Sieburgh (n. 7).
 73 e.g., CRvB 22 December 2008, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2008:BG8776 and CRvB 4 August 2011, 
ECLI:NL:CRVB:2011:BR5381.
 74 See Gerards (n. 35), pp. 33– 36.
 75 In more detail, see J. H. Gerards, ‘Samenloop van nationale en Europese grondrechtenbepalingen— hoe moet 
de rechter daarmee omgaan?’, (2010) 3 Tijdschrift voor Constitutioneel Recht, pp. 224– 55.
 76 For more information see the yearly reports the government sends to the parliament to inform it about 
international human rights procedures (Kamerstukken 32735). The 2016 report shows that of the cases currently 






V. Reception of the Pan- European General Principles 
of Good Administration through Application of Other 
CoE Instruments
Non- binding decisions of international organizations, such as recommendations, obvi-
ously do not entail legal obligations for the Netherlands.77 However, this does not imply 
that legislators, policy- makers, and courts turn a blind eye to recommendations, decisions, 
and other instruments of soft law by international organizations such as the CoE. Although 
the courts are not obliged to comply with them, they may refer to such instruments when 
interpreting and applying binding rules of international law. Similarly, just like the binding 
CoE Conventions, these non- binding instruments may be taken into account in legislative 
and administrative processes of rule- and decision- making. As already mentioned, how-
ever, the practice of doing so is uneven and, generally, it is much more common for judg-
ments and legislative materials to refer to the ECHR (cf. MN. 7.36 et seq.).
These examples do not intend to give an exhaustive overview of the reception of pan- 
European general principles of good administration through legislation or case law. 
References to CoE documents can frequently be found in parliamentary papers. For ex-
ample, the CM Recommendation No. R (91) 1 on administrative sanctions (cf. MN. 1.65) 
was referred to in the legislative history of the Awb and has also been mentioned in case 
law.78 This (non- binding) recommendation contains a set of principles that public author-
ities should comply with when imposing punitive administrative sanctions. Interestingly, 
however, in this case the reference to the soft law instrument was combined with a reference 
to the case law of the ECHR, which has stronger legal force. The government emphasized 
that the principles listed in this recommendation were mostly based on Article 6 CHR and 
corresponding case law; it also mentioned that these principles were already observed in 
the national legal order and were merely made more concrete in the legislative proposal.79
Another CoE instrument that has been referred to in the context of the Awb is the European 
Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (cf. MN. 1.56). When the Awb was amended 
to incorporate rules on the use of language in communication with administrative bodies, 
including a provision on the use of the Frisian next to the Dutch language, the explanatory 
memorandum explained that the main provisions in this treaty, which at that time (1993) 
was signed but not ratified by the Netherlands, were far more abstract than the detailed 
provisions in the legislative proposal, thereby avoiding any overlap between the legal docu-
ments but instead reinforcing their meaning.80 Interestingly, the provisions on the use of 
the Frisian language were removed from the Awb in 2011 and have been laid down in a 
separate Act on the use of the Frisian language with the argument that the use of this lan-
guage should be guaranteed not only in administrative communication but also in judicial 
per cent of the pending cases concern migration law (Rapportage 2016 Internationale Mensenrechtenprocedures, 
Kamerstukken I 2016/ 17, 32735, No. 170 (Annex) 66). In 2016 the ECtHR found one violation of the Convention in 
an administrative law case, Gillissen v. the Netherlands, since the equality of arms principle had been insufficiently 
respected in a procedure on social security measures (Gillissen v. the Netherlands [39966/ 09] 15 March 2016).
 77 e.g., ABRvS 22 June 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BQ8830 at [2.4.1.].
 78 RBAMS 28 January 2000, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2000:AA5739.
 79 Kamerstukken II 2003/ 04, 29702, No. 3, p. 124.
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communication.81 Thus, this example raises the more general question of to what extent 
CoE documents address an issue of general administrative law or a more general (constitu-
tional) issue. Indeed, this is the type of question that the presentation of the four case studies 
hereafter aims to highlight.
1. The European Charter of Local Self- Government
One CoE instrument that has proven to be of some relevance for the Netherlands is the 
European Charter of Local Self- Government82 (cf. MN. 1.58). In 2005 a study found that 
the Charter was little known in the Netherlands and, consequently, it did not have much 
impact.83 Nevertheless, it is clear that the document plays a modest role in legislative and 
scholarly debates regarding the role and institutional position of municipalities.84
To understand the Charter’s (lack of) impact it is useful to know that the Netherlands is 
a decentralized unitary state where the role of local governments is determined by two 
sets of competences.85 First, municipalities cooperate with the central government in 
implementing legislation and centrally determined policies (‘medebewind’— delegated 
government or co- governance). Second, in fields not regulated by the central government 
municipalities can autonomously take their own decisions and shape their own policies 
(‘autonomie’). Even in these autonomous fields, however, the central government is em-
powered to monitor and supervise the municipalities. It can withhold its approval of by- laws 
or reverse municipal decisions because of an incompatibility with higher law or because of 
policy reasons relating to expediency (doelmatigheidsoverwegingen). Over the past decades 
the number of fields regulated by means of co- government have gradually increased at the 
expense of autonomous regulation. Even though municipalities often enjoy discretion in 
these fields autonomy for local governments is currently rather limited,86 which has given 
rise to considerable scholarly and political debate.87
Given its emphasis on local autonomy it could be expected that the European Charter of 
Local Self- Government plays a role in the Dutch debate on decentralized government and 
autonomy of municipalities. Indeed, the Charter is sometimes referred to in relation to le-
gislative proposals having an impact on local self- government. An example can be found 
in legislation on the supervision of decentralized government, which was introduced in 
2012: literally, the Act on Revitalization of Generic Supervision (Wet revitalisering generiek 
toezicht).88 The aim of this legislation was to simplify and streamline the complex system of 
 81 Kamerstukken II 2011/ 12, 33335, No. 3, pp. 3 and 6.
 82 Trb 1987, 63. The Charter entered into force for the Netherlands in 1991 (Trb 1991, 61).
 83 C.B.M. van Haaren- Dresens, ‘Het Handvest lokale autonomie en gemeenten: maakt onbekend onbemind?’, 
(2005) Gemeentestem, pp. 9– 15.
 84 See in particular the examples given in: J.L.W. Broeksteeg et al, Constitutionele normen en decentralisatie. Een 
evaluatie van Hoofdstuk 7 Grondwet, Kamerstukken II 2009/ 10, 31570, No. 16 (Appendix) 55.
 85 See further Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (CLRAE), Local and regional democracy in the 
Netherlands (CG(26)7final) of 26 March2014 CG(26)7FINAL; for a general basis in English, see, e.g., P.P.T. 
Bovend’Eert and C.A.J.M. Kortmann, Constitutional Law in the Netherlands (2nd ed. 2012), pp. 53 et seq. This is 
further regulated in Chapter 7 of the Grondwet as well as in the Gemeentewet.
 86 See critically on this, e.g., CLRAE (n. 85) at [5c.].
 87 For recent scholarly contributions to this debate, see, e.g., S.A.J. Munneke, ‘Medebewind’, (2016) 61 
Gemeentestem, p. 327; D.J. Elzinga, ‘Naar een nieuwe vorm van zelfbestuur’, (2016) 100 Gemeentestem, p. 541.





supervision in relation to co- government (medebewind). In the explanatory memorandum 
the government mentioned that the ‘proposed system of intergovernmental supervision 
was tested against and made compatible with Article 8 of the Charter, which contains guar-
antees concerning intergovernmental supervision on local self- government’.89 Thus, the 
Charter seemed to function as a relevant legal standard for the proposed legislation even 
if it is not clear what the government’s ‘test’ entailed and which incompatibilities were re-
moved because of its results.90
It must be emphasized, however, that such specific attention is paid to the Charter only 
rarely. It is much more common that the document is not mentioned at all in explanatory 
memoranda or in parliamentary debates, even where such attention could be expected. 
For example, in the parliamentary papers accompanying legislation on the observance of 
European law by public entities (of which municipalities form part) the Charter is not re-
ferred to in any way, even though the legislation entailed important competences for the cen-
tral government to supervise and intervene in local decisions concerning European law.91 
Similarly, not a single reference to the Charter can be found in the legislation introducing 
important revisions of the governance structure of municipalities (Wet dualisering 
gemeentebestuur and Wet dualisering gemeentelijke medebewindsbevoegdheden).92
In yet other legislative discussions the Charter is mentioned but does not play any signifi-
cant role. For example, in relation to a bill on sustainable public finance (Wet houdbare 
overheidsfinanciën) some members of parliament were curious to know how its proposals 
related to the principle that decentralized government ought to be autonomous. More spe-
cifically, they asked the government ‘whether there was not a European Charter that pointed 
to the importance of decentralization, self- governance, et cetera?’. The government replied 
that such a Charter indeed existed and that it emphasized the importance of local autonomy 
but the government also mentioned that the Charter allowed the legislature to limit the au-
tonomy of local governments. Implicitly, thus, the government suggested that it could make 
use of this possibility in the current legislation. This seems to have ended the debate since 
no further references to the Charter can be seen in the parliamentary debates on the bill.
The discernible impact of the European Charter of Local Self- Government is equally 
limited where case law is concerned. On a few occasions local authorities have started a pro-
cedure against the central government when they felt that new legislation or decisions en-
croached on their autonomy. In 2011 the municipality of The Hague went to court when the 
Minister for Infrastructure reversed a permit the municipality had granted to a company to 
build an offshore windmill park.93 According to the municipality the minister’s reversal was 
incompatible with Articles 2, 4, and 11 of the European Charter of Local Self- Government. 
In its judgment the ABRvS held that Articles 2 and 4 of the Charter could not be regarded 
 89 Kamerstukken II 2009/ 10, 32389, No. 3, p. 9.
 90 See also R.J.M.H. de Greef and C.B.M. van Haaren- Dresens, ‘Spontane vernietiging wegens strijd 
met algemeen belang’, (2011) 116 Gemeentestem, pp. 114– 22.
 91 Wet Naleving Europese regelgeving publieke entiteiten (Wet NERPE), Stb. 2012, 245 (Kamerstuknr. 32157). 
For more attention to the Charter, see J. H. Gerards, ‘De naleving van het Europese recht door de decentrale 
overheden: naar een herzien stelsel van toezicht’, (2000) SEW, Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht, pp. 
208– 15.
 92 Respectively Stb 2002, 112 (Kamerstuknr. 27751) and Stb 2012, 531 (Kamerstuknr. 16538).
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as self- executing provisions of international law because they were not sufficiently precisely 
drafted. As for Article 11, it noted that the Kingdom of the Netherlands was not bound to 
respect this provision as a result of a declaration made at the time of ratification. For that 
reason the ABRvS rejected the appeal. This judgment shows that enforcing the Charter by 
means of judicial proceedings is not easy. Nevertheless, it also makes it clear that there still 
might be a possibility of giving legal effect to the Charter. After all, the judgment concerned 
only three specific provisions and the ABRvS did not exclude the possibility that it might 
find differently for other Charter provisions.
Particularly interesting in this regard is a procedure started by the municipality of Voorst on 
the Participation Act (Participatiewet), which had the aim of decentralizing competences 
regarding the distribution of social benefits.94 To enable the municipalities to exercise the 
tasks entrusted to them under the new legislation an earmarked budgetary allowance was 
allocated to each of them. In 2014 the Secretary of State for Home Affairs sought to recover 
about one- fifth of the budget allocated to Voorst because an audit had shown its failure to 
fully realize the objectives set in the legislation. The municipality claimed that it had sub-
mitted incomplete information to the auditors by accident and it asked the Secretary of 
State to revise the recovery decision based on the complete and correct information. The 
Secretary of State refused to do so, however, because of the importance of correct and timely 
delivery of information for the audit. According to the municipality the Secretary of State’s 
refusal ran contrary to Article 8 (3) of the European Charter of Local Self- Government 
since the recovery decision was not proportionate to the objectives of the system for ac-
countability. In its judgment in appeal the CRvB considered that it did not need to answer 
the question as to the direct effect of this provision because the recovery of the allowance 
was not incompatible with the Charter anyway. Even if the recovery mechanism could be 
regarded as strict it was sufficiently justified by the great importance of the legislature’s de-
sire to prompt timely and correct delivery of accountability information. Again, this judg-
ment shows that it is not excluded that certain provisions of the Charter are given direct 
effect and can be invoked directly before the Dutch courts. It also makes it clear, however, 
that an appeal to the Charter will not be easily accepted.
2. The CoE Convention on Access to Official Documents
Although the law on access to official documents is considered to be part of general admin-
istrative law, the general rules on access to official documents have never been integrated 
into the Awb. Instead these rules are laid down in a separate Freedom of Information Act 
(Wet openbaarheid van bestuur— Wob). Although the drafters of the Awb have repeatedly 
proposed combining these two pieces of legislation, practical objections and, at an under-
lying level, political sensitivity have impeded this integration until now. In the 1980s, when 
the first package of the Awb was drafted, integration of the rules on freedom of information 
into the Awb was considered inconvenient, since a new legislative proposal for the adoption 
of a new Wob had just been launched.95 A more recent proposal to integrate the Wob into 
 94 CRvB 9 February 2017, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2017:487.




the Awb was not followed by the government, because it did not want to delay the enact-
ment of a new package of the Awb by adopting a new position on the Wob.96
For many decades the right of access to official documents has developed rather autono-
mously in the Netherlands, i.e., independently of the ‘law’ of the CoE. In 1965 the Hoge 
Raad held that Article 10 ECHR does not imply an obligation for a person to provide the 
information he holds to third parties, irrespective of whether this person is a public body 
or another legal or natural person.97 Thus, a right of access to State- held information could 
not be derived from Article 10 ECHR. Consequently, the first Wob that was proposed98 and 
adopted99 in the 1970s did not have its roots in Article 10 ECHR, but in national initiatives, 
which in the aftermath of World War II aimed to promote governmental information whilst 
at the same time excluding governmental propaganda.100 The resulting Wob of 1978 was 
replaced in 1991 by the current Wob, which is still in force.101 One important characteristic 
of the Wob is that an applicant does not need to state his interest when requesting govern-
mental information (Article 3 (3) Wob). Thus, it is irrelevant whether a scholar, a journalist 
or a citizen requests information. The immediate consequence of this rule is that access to 
information for one person implies access to this information for everyone. For the pur-
poses of assessing the impact of CoE law on national legislation it is worth mentioning that 
neither the legislative history of the Wob of 1978 or the current Wob contains references to 
the ECHR or other documents of the CoE.
With the CoE Convention on Access to Official Documents (cf. MN. 1.59), together with 
recent case law on Article 10 ECHR (cf. MN. 1.48 et seq.), this ‘autonomous’ development 
of the right of access to governmental information seemed to belong to the past. The Dutch 
government was closely involved in the negotiations on the CoE Convention on Access 
to Official Documents, both because it perceived access to government information to be 
of great importance and because of the expected impact of this treaty on national legisla-
tion.102 The objective of the Dutch government in the negotiations was to achieve a level of 
protection similar to the Wob.103 The government claimed success in this effort: the con-
sequences of the convention for national legislation would only be marginal, since both 
the institutional scope (applying to public and (certain) semi- public bodies) and the re-
fusal grounds of the convention were almost identical to the existing legal rules in national 
legislation.
Nonetheless, the government acknowledged one important difference between the CoE 
Convention on Access to Official Documents and the Wob:  whereas Article 7 of CoE 
Convention stipulates that a fee charged to the applicant for a copy of the official docu-
ment should be reasonable and not exceed the actual costs of reproduction and delivery of 
 96 Kamerstukken II 2003/ 04, 29 702, No. 3, p. 6.
 97 HR 25 July 1965, ECLI:NL:PHR:1965:AC4587, NJ 1966, 115 (Televizier). The issue was brought before the 
European Commission of Human Rights (application No. 2690/ 65) but since the case was finally settled between 
the parties the commission did not give its decision on this issue.
 98 Kamerstukken II 1974/ 75, 13 418, No. 1– 4.
 99 Wet openbaarheid van bestuur, Stb. 1978, 581.
 100 Kamerstukken II 1974/ 75, 13 418, No. 1– 4, p. 1.
 101 Wet van 31 oktober 1991, houdende regelen betreffende de openbaarheid van bestuur, Stb. 1991, 703, as 
amended afterwards.
 102 Aanhangsel Handelingen II 2009/ 10, No. 1305.
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the document, the Wob does not exclude in advance the fee imposed exceeding the actual 
reproduction costs (e.g. the costs of searching and gathering information). This made the 
government hesitate about whether, in the end, it would be wise to sign the treaty.
Eventually the government decided not to sign this treaty. Although it originally intended 
to make the Wob more compatible with the treaty as far as the fees were concerned,104 it did 
not manage to submit a legislative proposal to achieve more compliance. Moreover, signing 
the treaty would require scrutinizing all existing publicity regimes in national legislation 
as to their compliance with the treaty. According to the government such an effort would 
unnecessarily burden the administrative authorities. Since a quick scan had further shown 
that the consequences of this treaty would only be marginal, the government found no pri-
ority in signing the agreement. The government saw confirmation of this lack of urgency 
in the developments in other countries, which did not make much progress in signing this 
treaty either. According to the government not signing the CoE Convention on Access to 
Official Documents would not mean that this convention would be completely irrelevant: it 
promised not to initiate any proposal that would contravene the provisions of the treaty.105
Although the Dutch government has still not taken a final decision on signing the treaty, 
there is a legislative proposal for an Open Government Act (Wet open overheid— Woo) 
that has been adopted by the House of Representatives and is currently pending before the 
Senate.106 According to the Members of Parliament who took the initiative on this legisla-
tive proposal the Woo not only builds explicitly on certain elements of the CoE Convention, 
such as the extension of the freedom of information regime to semi- public bodies and the 
obligation to register all official documents, but also mainly complies with the provisions 
of this treaty.107 However, it is acknowledged that at some points the Woo does not fully 
coincide with the treaty, e.g. the existence of some additional refusal grounds in national 
legislation. The promoters of the Woo admit that, should the treaty be signed and ratified in 
the future, it might be necessary to amend this act.108 Nonetheless, the CoE Convention on 
Access to Official Documents appears to be an important, although not exclusive, ‘point of 
reference’ for the drafting of this legislative proposal.109
Since the CoE Convention on Access to Official Documents has not entered into force for 
the Netherlands, it has scarcely been invoked before the administrative courts. Not surpris-
ingly, the few cases that refer to the CoE Convention deal with the level of the fees calculated 
for access to official documents. The administrative courts are univocal in rejecting an ap-
peal to this treaty: as this treaty had not been ratified and is therefore not binding, it does 
not prevent administrative authorities from integrating search and anonymization costs 
 104 Kamerstukken II 2010/ 11, 32 802, No. 1, p. 13.
 105 Kamerstukken II 2010/ 11, 32 802, No. 1, p.  3– 4. See also E.J. Daalder, ‘In afwachting van een 
regeringsstandpunt over Tromsø’, (2011) 5 Nederlands Juristenblad, pp. 10– 11.
 106 Kamerstukken II 2015/ 16, 33 328, see on this proposal Klingenberg (n. 60), pp. 20– 24.
 107 Kamerstukken II 2013/ 14, 33 328, No. 9, pp. 4– 5.
 108 Kamerstukken II 2013/ 14, 33 328, No. 12, pp. 11– 12.
 109 See in particular Kamerstukken II 2013/ 14, 33 328, No. 12, pp. 11– 12, where the promoters of the Open 
Government Act respond to questions on the compatibility of the proposed act with the CoE Convention on 





in the fees.110 To the extent that courts have held that some costs could not be charged to 
the budget of the applicant, such judgment was not based on norms derived from the CoE 
Convention on Access to Official Documents but on national norms.111 Thus, the impact of 
the CoE Convention in case law is negligible.
Unlike most other cases one case before the ABRvS did not deal with the level of the fees 
but with the institutional scope of the Wob. An applicant was confronted with a refusal by 
the Association of Dutch Municipalities (Vereniging van Nederlandse Gemeenten— VNG) 
to make certain documents available. The applicant invoked both the CoE Convention on 
Access to Official Documents and Article 10 ECHR to support his claim that this associ-
ation was obliged to give access to certain documents. The appeal to the treaty was rejected 
simply because the Netherlands was not a party to this treaty. With regard to Article 10 
ECHR the ABRvS considered that this right does not imply the right to receive informa-
tion from a legal person that is not classified as an administrative body, thereby calling to 
mind the earlier mentioned Televizier judgment as far as non- governmental legal persons 
are involved.112
This relationship between the Wob and Article 10 ECHR turns out to be far more important 
in national case law than the relationship between the Wob 1991 and the CoE Convention 
on Access to Official Documents. In 2011 the ABRvS already seemed to be assuming that 
Article 10 ECHR might entail a right to receive State- held information, but considered that 
the refusal ground of personal policy ideas in Article 11 Wob was a restriction prescribed 
by law and necessary in a democratic society to protect the rights of others.113 After the 
ECtHR in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság114 had acknowledged the right of access to State- held 
information as a corollary of Article 10 ECHR in 2016 (MN. 1.48 et seq.), the ABRvS built 
on this by denying access to additional State- held information to an applicant who did not 
have the capacity of a public watchdog, thereby suggesting that public watchdogs can de-
rive more far- reaching rights from the freedom of information regime.115 Finally, in a very 
recent judgment, the ABRvS ruled on the compatibility of the Wob with Article 10 ECHR. 
It held that while, in general, the refusal grounds in the Wob could be assumed to be ne-
cessary in a democratic society for the protection of the interests mentioned in Article 10 
ECHR it could not be excluded in advance that an applicant might indicate that these re-
fusal grounds are not in compliance with Article 10 ECHR in a particular case. In these 
very particular circumstances refusal of access to State- held information could constitute a 
breach of Article 10 ECHR, depending on the nature of the information sought and the role 
of the applicant.116
 110 GHSGR 6 July 2011, ECLI:NL:GHSGR:2011:BR0373 at [7.5.3], as confirmed by HR 8 February 2013, 
ECLI:NL:HR:2013:BX0945.
 111 ABRvS 22 August 2012, ECLI:NL:RVS:2012:BX5240.
 112 ABRvS 25 May 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BQ5933.
 113 ABRvS 19 January 2011, ECLI:NL:RVS:2011:BP1315, AB 2011/ 148 (case note E.J. Daalder).
 114 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság case (n. 59); case note T. Barkhuysen and M.L. van Emmerik in AB 2017/ 1.
 115 ABRvS 22 February 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:498, AB 2017/ 147 (case note J. Tingen).
 116 ABRvS 25 October 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:2883.
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3. The CoE Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard 
to Automatic Data Processing
The chronological development of legislation on the protection of personal data is some-
what similar to that of the legislation on access to official documents, i.e., starting in the 
1970s. In 1972, just before the adoption of two recommendations by the CM on the protec-
tion of personal data in 1973 and 1974,117 the State Commission on the protection of private 
life in respect of personal registration (Staatscommissie bescherming persoonlijke levenssfeer 
in verband met persoonsregistraties) was installed. The decision to install this commission 
was an immediate response to the resistance against the population census of 1971.118
The Staatscommissie presented a first draft for general privacy legislation in 1976119 that 
was roughly followed by the government in November 1981 when it submitted a legislative 
proposal on the protection of personal data.120 In the explanatory memorandum the gov-
ernment made it clear that it aimed to build on the two recommendations of 1973 and 1974 
as well as on the CoE Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Data Processing (cf. MN. 1.60) that had been concluded in January 1981.121 However, it 
was not until 1988 that a strong revision of the initial legislative proposal122 was ultimately 
adopted and the Act on personal registrations (Wet persoonsregistraties— Wpr) entered into 
force.123
This Wpr was replaced by the Act on the protection of personal data (Wet bescherming 
persoonsgegevens— Wbp) in 2001, which implemented Directive 95/ 46/ EC on the protec-
tion of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data. Very recently, as a response to the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation124 
introducing a new data protection regime as from May 2018 in the EU, a legislative proposal 
to implement this regulation in the Dutch legal order has been adopted.125
The legislative history of the Wpr, the first general act on personal data protection, shows a 
strong orientation towards the Convention No. 108, as shown by multiple references to this 
treaty in support of the applicable national rules. However, it was only after the entry into 
force of this national legislation that the Netherlands could sign and ratify the Convention 
No. 108 in 1988 and 1993, respectively,126 since accordance of national legislation with the 
treaty was a condition for signing the treaty.
 117 CM Resolution (73)22 of 26 September 1973 on the Protection of the privacy of individuals vis- à- vis elec-
tronic data banks in the private sector, and CM Resolution (74) 29 of 20 September 1974 on the Protection of the 
privacy of individuals vis- à- vis electronic data banks in the public sector.
 118 In greater depth, see M. Overkleeft- Verburg, De Wet persoonsregistraties. norm, toepassing en evaluatie 
(1995).
 119 Staatscommissie Koopmans, Privacy en persoonsregistraties (1976).
 120 Kamerstukken II 1981/ 82, 17207, No. 2 (Wet op de persoonsregistraties).
 121 Kamerstukken II 1981/ 82, 17207, No. 3, p. 6.
 122 Kamerstukken II 1984/ 95, 19095, No. 1– 3.
 123 Wet persoonsregistraties, Stb. 1988, 665.
 124 Regulation (EU) 2016/ 679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation).
 125 Implementing Act General Data Protection Regulation of 16 May 2018 (Uitvoeringswet Algemene 
Verordening Gegevensbescherming).






In its explanatory memorandum to the subsequent Wbp the government explained that the 
Convention No. 108 had not ensured free movement of data within the EU, thereby showing 
the need for additional EU legislation.127 Hence, with the adoption of the Directive 95/ 46/ 
EC and the national implementation thereof, this directive has become the main point of 
reference for the interpretation and application of national legislation on privacy protec-
tion, even though the government emphasized that the Convention No. 108 would remain 
relevant for areas not covered by the Directive 95/ 46/ EC.128 Indirectly, the treaty may still 
be relevant with regard to free movement of data since the Directive 95/ 46/ EC aimed to re-
spect the principles laid down in the treaty (cf. MN. 1.60).
What is more the Wbp also explicitly aims to respect Article 8 ECHR.129 Case law shows that 
the ECtHR is willing to interpret this provision with explicit reference to the Convention 
No. 108 in issues of data processing.130
In sum, the Convention No. 108 has lost its (limited) direct relevance for national legis-
lation of EU Member States, since the Directive 95/ 46/ EC became the primary orienta-
tion point in issues of data processing. Today the Implementation Act of the General Data 
Protection Regulation is the new orientation point, again articulating the dominance of EU 
legislation. Nonetheless, the explanatory memorandum accompanying the proposal for the 
Implementation Act mentions that the new Regulation is a step, but not the final step, in the 
protection of personal data. In that regard the government refers to the current negotiations 
on the Convention No. 108 to remove incompatibilities between this treaty and EU legis-
lation.131 Possibly, therefore, in the future the Treaty may regain its importance for Dutch 
administrative law. What remains is a limited indirect relevance, mainly via the application 
of Article 8 ECHR.
The same conclusion holds for the case law of administrative courts: the Convention No. 
108 does not play an important role in the case law of the administrative courts, at least not 
directly. As far as the treaty is mentioned in (recent) case law, it is mainly132 as part of a refer-
ence in a recital of the Directive 95/ 46/ EC or an explanatory statement to Article 8 CFR.133 
However, even before the adoption of the Directive 95/ 46/ EC the Convention No. 108 did 
not seem to play an important role in national case law. This might be due to the limited pe-
riod when the it was in force in the Netherlands before the adoption of the Directive 95/ 46/ 
EC (1993– 95).
 127 Kamerstukken II 1997/ 1998, 25 892, No. 3, p. 4.
 128 Kamerstukken II 1997/ 1998, 25 892, No. 3, p. 14.
 129 Kamerstukken II 1997/ 1998, 25 892, No. 3, p. 8.
 130 See, e.g., Z v. Finland (22009/ 93) 25 February 1997 ECtHR; Amann v. Switzerland (27798/ 95) 16 February 
2000 ECtHR [GC]; Rotaru v. Romania (28341/ 95) 4 May 2000 ECtHR [GC].
 131 Kamerstukken II 2017/ 18, 34851, No. 3, pp. 8– 9.
 132 For scarce exceptions, see Rb Midden- Nederland 9 August 2013, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2013:3268 (broad inter-
pretation of personal data under Article 8 ECHR because of CoE Convention on Protection of Individuals with 
regard to Automatic Data Processing).
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4. Decisions of the ECSR and the ‘Bed, Bath, and Bread’ Issue
The final case study to be discussed in this section does not so much concern a particular 
CoE Convention as the impact of non- binding decisions of the ECSR on Dutch adminis-
trative law in the particular field of migration and social security law. This case study is pre-
sented as a narrative to demonstrate how various European and national instruments may 
interact in influencing both national case law and national policy in the Netherlands.
The issue to be discussed here is known in the Netherlands as the ‘bed, bath, bread issue’ 
(bed, bad, brood- discussie).134 It specifically concerns the question of to what extent and 
how the minimum rights to food, clothing, and shelter can be enjoyed under the European 
Social Charter (ESC) (cf. MN. 1.56) by migrants whose applications for international pro-
tection or for a residence permit have been rejected and who are no longer lawfully resident 
in the Netherlands.
The Aliens Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet 2000) provides that if an alien is no longer lawfully 
resident he should leave the Netherlands of his own volition and the benefits in kind pro-
vided to him (such as food or shelter) are terminated. In addition, the Social Support Act 
(Wet Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning) specifies that aliens who are not lawfully resident in 
the Netherlands are not eligible for municipal shelter services or for other forms of social 
support. According to a number of non- governmental organizations the resulting lack of 
access to basic shelter and minimum subsistence for ‘irregular aliens’ is irreconcilable with 
the ESC. They asked the ECSR to examine the Dutch legislation and policy and indeed, in 
2014, the ECSR found that it constituted a violation of Articles 13 (4) and 31 (2) ESC.135 
A heated debate ensued on the consequences of this decision.136 The government took the 
position that it did not have to give any immediate effect to the decision and it postponed 
any further decision- making until the CM had had an opportunity to review the ECSR’s de-
cision and to present its views on the necessary follow- up.137
 134 On this debate, see, e.g., Y. Donders, ‘Europa’s voorvechter van economische en sociale rechten— Het 
Europees Comité voor Sociale Rechten’, (2014) 4 Ars Aequi, pp. 253– 61; T. Barkhuysen, ‘Bed, bad en brood 
voor uitgeprocedeerde asielzoekers’, (2014) 2055 Nederlands Juristenblad, p. 2841; Th. van Boven, F. Coomans, 
C. Flinterman, and M. Kamminga, ‘Bed, bad en brood: een mensenrecht’, (2015) 1093 Nederlands Juristenblad, 
pp. 1535– 536; D. Mohammadi, ‘Opvang van uitgeprocedeerde vreemdelingen: waarom we het voorbeeld van 
de gemeenten moeten opvolgen’, (2015) 10 Ars Aequi, pp. 749– 61; Gerards (n. 2), pp. 11– 85; K. Zwaan and P. 
Minderhoud, ‘Bed- bad- brood: Vrijheidsbeperking niet in strijd met verplichting om opvang te bieden?’, (2016) 
165 Gemeentestem, pp. 891– 98; A. Terlouw, ‘Commentaar bij de bed- bad- brood- uitspraken van RvS en CRvB: Een 
sluitend systeem van opvang?’, (2016) 1 Asiel&Migrantenrecht, pp. 4– 9.
 135 European Federation of National Organisations Working with the Homeless (FEANTSA) v. Netherlands (86/ 
2012) 1 July 2014 ECSR; Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. Netherlands (90/ 2013) 1 July 2014 ECSR. 
Earlier, the ECSR had already imposed an obligation on the Netherlands to guarantee that no one would be com-
pelled to live under inhumane conditions; see Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. Netherlands (90/ 2013) 
25 October 2013 ECSR [immediate measures]. See in greater depth on this, e.g., Donders (n. 134), pp. 253– 61 and 
Mohammadi (n. 134), pp. 749– 61.
 136 See Gerards (n. 2), pp. 11– 85.
 137 On the procedure, see Article 9 of the Additional Protocol to the ESC; see also R. Churchill and U. Khaliq, 
‘The Collective Complaints System of the European Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance 
with Economic and Social Rights?’, (2004) EJIL, pp. 417– 56 (pp. 438 et seq.). On the government’s position, see, 
e.g., the answers to parliamentary questions raised by MPs Pechtold, Van Haersma Buma, Slob, Van Ojik, Van 
der Staaij, and Roemer, 30 April 2015, Aanhangsel Handelingen TK 2014/ 15, 2134; letter to the Parliament by 
the Secretaries of State for Security and Justice and for Public Health, Welfare and Sports of 11 November 2014, 
Kamerstukken II 2014/ 15, 19637, 1915; letter to the Parliament by the Secretary of State for Security and Justice of 





In the meantime a number of (mainly lower) courts were asked to decide on concrete re-
fusals to provide shelter or food to irregular aliens.138 In their judgments the courts fre-
quently referred to the ECSR’s decision but in doing so they used different legal techniques 
with diverging legal outcomes. Some lower courts used the decision as support for their 
interpretation of the relevant ESC provisions or of the relevant legislation, or they referred 
to it to support a certain interpretation of the ECHR.139 By contrast other courts refused to 
give legal effect to the decision by the ECSR because of its lack of legally binding effect or 
because the CM itself had not yet pronounced on the matter.140
In April 2015 the CM handed down its resolution, which offered rather less clarity about 
the exact obligations of the Netherlands than many had hoped for.141 The government read 
the resolution as supporting its own view that the ECSR had provided for an improper in-
terpretation of the Charter and that its policy did not violate its international obligations.142 
All the same, in response to the decision and the resolution, the government presented a 
new policy which roughly entails that irregular aliens who are legally obliged to return to 
their countries of origin can find shelter in a ‘liberty- restricting institution’ until their re-
turn can be effected (vrijheidsbeperkende locatie).143
Eventually, the two high administrative courts competent to decide on these matters— the 
ABRvS and the CRvB— were asked to review the new policy for its compatibility with the 
ECHR and the ESC.144 In their reasoning the two courts referred to the ECSR’s decision 
in different ways.145 The ABRvS chose to apply the relevant provisions of the ECHR, read 
in the light of the ECSR’s decision, while the CRvB reviewed the national policy and legis-
lation more directly for compatibility with the ECSR’s views. Although the reasoning di-
verged the outcomes of the two cases were coordinated— both highest courts decided that 
the new policy was in line with the relevant international obligations. Now, for the ECHR, 
this finding has been confirmed by the ECtHR.146
These judgments have not ended the debate, however, as is shown by a series of procedures 
in which aliens— sometimes successfully— have contested the application of the new policy 
in their cases. In these more recent judgments the ECSR decisions have not played any 
meaningful role. Instead the ABRvS has emphasized that the new policy has been condoned 
 138 For a review of the various decisions focused on the effect given to the decision by the ECSR, see Gerards (n. 
2), pp. 56 et seq.
 139 Gerards (n. 2), pp. 56 et seq.
 140 Gerards (n. 2), p. 64.
 141 Resolution CM/ ResChS (2015) 5 Conference of European Churches (CEC) v. the Netherlands (90/ 2013), 15 
April 2015.
 142 Letter by the Secretaries of State for Security and Justice and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Social 
Affairs and Employment, Kamerstukken II 2014/ 15, No. 1994, p. 1.
 143 Letter by the Secretaries of State for Security and Justice and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Social 
Affairs and Employment (n. 142), pp. 2 et seq., complemented by the decision by the Secretary of State of 28 March 
2017, WBR 2017/ 3; see Stcrt 2017, 17943. For a brief description of the new policy in English, see Hunde v. the 
Netherlands (17931/ 16) 5 July 2016 ECtHR [dec] at [28] et seq.
 144 ABRvS 26 November 2015, ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:3415 and CRvB 26 November 2015, 
ECLI:NL:CRVB:2015:3803. The ABRvS has confirmed this judgment in more recent cases; see, e.g., ABRvS 29 June 
2016, ECLI:NL:RVS:2016:1782.
 145 In more detail, see Gerards (n. 2), pp. 65– 66.
 146 See Hunde case (n. 143). Although a number of municipalities want to continue offering basic amenities to 
undocumented aliens the central government has indicated it shall no longer negotiate with them on the topic; see 
letter to the Parliament by the Secretary of State on the further understanding of the intergovernmental agreement 
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by the ECtHR and, for that reason, it cannot be held to be incompatible with the ECHR.147 
Moreover, it seems that the debate in the courts has shifted to the legal classification of the 
new policy, the applicable legal standards, and the individual circumstances of an alien 
which could possibly justify an exception.148 Currently, therefore, the CoE documents seem 
to be of less relevance than at the beginning.
VI. Direct Application of the Pan- European General 
Principles of Good Administration ‘faute de mieux’
As the case studies have illustrated recommendations and other non- binding soft law of 
the CoE usually play a role in administrative case law merely as a source of inspiration or 
as confirmation of an interpretation of a binding norm such as a provision of the ECHR. 
Theoretically, however, they also might play a more independent legal role, for example 
where national legal provisions are lacking or where the administration has wide discre-
tionary powers.
It goes too far to say that Dutch administrative law is familiar with such a ‘faute de mieux’ 
approach, i.e., the direct application of CoE soft law for lack of a better alternative in terms 
of a legally binding provision (cf. MN. 2.58 et seq.). Indeed Dutch administrative courts 
hardly refer to soft law of the CoE in order to determine the content of a general principle 
applicable to Dutch law. One explanation may be that there are not many cases in which it is 
agreed upon that legally binding provisions are lacking; the general principles of adminis-
trative law as codified in statutory law provide for an extensive set of national norms with a 
general character and, in many cases, fall- back options can be found in the ECHR or in EU 
law, as the case studies have illustrated. This inclination to stay rather close to national le-
gislative provisions, use the well- known general principles of administrative law, or rely on 
European treaty provisions as explained by the CJEU and the ECtHR is not only a tendency 
of the civil courts but of the administrative courts as well. In so far as these courts do refer to 
CM recommendations such reference is therefore made only to support a certain interpret-
ation of a (binding) provision of the ECHR provision, especially in cases where there is no 
direct precedent of the ECtHR available in which that interpretation is supported or where 
an ECtHR judgment is relatively vague.
An example thereof is the so- called Clickfonds case where the Hoge Raad explicitly men-
tioned that its interpretation of Article 6 (2) ECHR concerning the presumption of inno-
cence was based on the case law of the ECtHR as it was confirmed by CM Recommendation 
(2003)13 on the provision of information through the media in relation to criminal pro-
ceedings.149 Another example is a case on the application of less repressive provisions in 
an administrative sanctioning procedure, where the administrative court referred to CM 
Recommendation No. R (91)1 on administrative sanctions to support its reading of Article 
 147 e.g., ABRvS 5 July 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:1741 at [8] .
 148 See, e.g., ABRvS 5 July 2017, ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:1826 and ECLI:NL:RVS:2017:1828.
 149 HR 13 July 2007, ECLI:NL:HR:2007:BA3161, NJ 2007/ 505 with comment by F. Vellinga- Schootstra. In this 
case law comment it was noted that the CM Recommendation (2003)13 should be a powerful impetus for the legis-





7 ECHR.150 Both examples show that courts only seem willing to rely on the soft law of the 
CoE if there is a sufficiently established link to a binding document, in this case the ECHR. 
Thus, in fact, in both criminal law and administrative law the national courts still do not 
really apply the soft law of the CoE but use it merely indirectly to give shape to a (binding) 
provision of the ECHR.
By contrast a very exceptional mode of application, ‘faute de mieux’, can be distinguished 
in Dutch administrative law with regard to treaty provisions by which the Netherlands is 
not formally bound. With regard to non- ratified law of the CoE there is a unique case of the 
Hoge Raad, again with respect to administrative sanctions, where it referred to Article 4 (the 
right not to be tried or punished twice) of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR, which has not been 
ratified by the Netherlands (cf. MN. 7.34). The Hoge Raad held that Article 4 of Protocol No. 
7, although not ratified, expressed the internationally acknowledged ne bis in idem prin-
ciple, which could be applied as a legally binding principle.151 Although this case did not 
concern a general principle of administrative law it helps to illustrate that, in very rare cases, 
an application by way of analogy can be seen in which non- ratified international law (in-
stead of soft law) is used by the courts as a seemingly free source of inspiration for finding a 
general principle of law. Such an application by way of analogy is not completely unfamiliar 
in Dutch administrative law: in the same vein administrative courts have been willing to 
apply provisions of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek) that are not directly applicable in an 
administrative case, albeit freely and in a modified way.152
Where a direct ‘faute de mieux’ application of soft law of the CoE by the courts is almost 
non- existent, it is worth mentioning that reference to the (soft) law of the CoE is some-
times made by Advocates- General in their opinions to the highest (civil, criminal, and ad-
ministrative) courts (cf. MN. 7.12). An illustrative example thereof is a case of the Hoge 
Raad on the detention regime in the Netherlands. While the Hoge Raad did not refer to the 
soft law of the CoE, the Advocate- General associated with the Hoge Raad mentioned CM 
Recommendation Rec(2006)13 on the use of remanding in custody, the conditions in which 
it takes place and the provision of safeguards against abuse, when discussing Articles 5 and 
6 (2 and 3) ECHR in relation to provisional custody.153 Admittedly, the number of examples 
of cases where the Advocates- General refer to the soft law of the CoE is very limited, but 
this might change in the future because of the recent introduction of an Advocate- General 
across all four highest administrative courts (instead of the Hoge Raad only).
In sum, as far as references to soft law of the CoE are concerned, most references are made 
in the framework of applying the ECHR. In those cases for the national administrative 
courts this simply amounts to the reception of European soft law through the application 
of the ECHR. Thus, what we can reasonably state is that soft law of the CoE— sometimes— 
actually supports the judgments of administrative courts and that it is possible that this soft 
law affects the meaning of general principles of administrative law. However, this is not very 
 150 RBAMS 28 January 2000, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2000:AA5739. According to Principle 2(2) of Recommendation 
No. R (91)1 the entry into force, after the act, of less repressive provisions should be to the advantage of the person 
on whom the administrative authority is considering imposing a sanction.
 151 HR 3 March 2015, ECLI: NL:HR: 2015:434, AB 2015/ 159 (Alcoholslotprogramma).
 152 e.g., ABRvS 3 July 2002, ECLI:NL:RVS:2002:AE4855, JB 2002/ 242.
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different from the meaning of other parts of soft law, too, for instance from the Algemene 
Rekenkamer or the National Ombudsperson. Their influence on judicial decisions in ad-
ministrative law is considered to be rather weak as well.154
VII. Reception of Pan- European General Principles 
of Good Administration by Promulgation of ‘Codes of Good 
Administrative Behaviour’
In the Netherlands there are no theoretical or legal objections to incorporating the soft law 
of the CoE (recommendations, etc.) in national soft law documents, such as reports of the 
National Ombudsperson and codes of governance like the Public Accountability Code 
(Code Goed Bestuur Publieke Dienstverlener), which is a governance code for public agen-
cies that have voluntarily agreed to join this code.155 Thus, in theory, the influence of soft 
CoE law on issues of good governance should be relatively easier to achieve than influence 
on issues of administrative law.
However, in practice, the number of references to recommendations and other docu-
ments (with the exception of the ECHR, cf. MN. 7.43) of the CoE in reports of the National 
Ombudsperson turns out to be very limited, especially with regard to issues of general ad-
ministrative law.156 Thus, the soft law of the CoE does not seem to play a significant role as 
far as the development of general administrative law is concerned. One explanation for this 
limited impact might be that the approach to ‘proper administration’ or ‘good governance’ 
adopted by the National Ombudsperson does not correspond with the contents of the CoE 
recommendations, which at least partly deal with the drafting of the legal rules. Other ex-
planations might be unfamiliarity with the CoE recommendations and other soft law and 
the different character of the soft law of the CoE compared to the ECHR.
VIII. Concluding Observations
When considering the impact of pan- European general principles of good administration 
in the Netherlands a clear demarcation line can be drawn between, on the one hand, the 
ECHR and, on the other hand, other (soft) law of the CoE— this is the ‘Dutch paradox’ of 
the legal effect given to instruments of international law. In general the Dutch legal order is 
assumed to be quite receptive to developments in international law. However, a closer look 
unveils that this reception depends on the issue of whether or not the relevant provisions of 
international law are self- executing, i.e., have direct effect. While all provisions of the ECHR 
are assumed to be self- executing this is less clear for other instruments of the CoE, to such a 
degree that their impact on the Dutch legal order is not self- evident.
 154 CRvB 30 June 2006, ECLI:NL:CRVB:2006:AY3870 and A.F.M. Brenninkmeijer, ‘Verantwoord omgaan met 
publieke middelen’, (2010) 30 Overheid & Aansprakelijkheid, pp. 50– 59 (p. 52).
 155 See https:// www.publiekverantwoorden.nl and Besemer (n. 24), pp. 195 et seq.
 156 As far as CoE documents are mentioned, several reports in the period 1996– 2017 refer to the Council of 
Europe Convention on the transfer of sentenced persons or the European Agreement on regulations governing the 





This Dutch paradox is illustrated well by the current contribution, which focused on the 
impact on Dutch administrative law of pan- European general principles of good admin-
istration as developed within the CoE. In that regard it should be first noted that the CoE 
does not provide for a coherent set of general rules of administrative law laid down in one 
specific document. Rather, pan- European general principles of good administration, to the 
extent that they exist, are scattered around in various legal documents with various legal 
statuses and various scopes.
Looking more closely at the impact of such CoE instruments on Dutch administrative law 
the following pattern can be discerned. First, it is obvious that the provisions of the ECHR 
and subsequent case law of the ECtHR have influenced Dutch administrative law. Especially, 
the guarantees of Article 6 ECHR (fair trial) and Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR 
(protection of property) have proven to be greatly important for the development of Dutch 
administrative law in a general trans- sectoral way, both institutionally and procedurally. 
Examples thereof are debates on the independence and impartiality of the highest adminis-
trative court, the equality of arms in administrative proceedings, a trial within a reasonable 
term in administrative proceedings, and legal guarantees on the withdrawal of administra-
tive decisions— all such debates have been and continue to be dominated by references to 
the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR. In addition, freedom rights such as family life, 
speech, and association have sometimes put additional pressure on issues of general admin-
istrative law, such as access to official documents (Article 10 ECHR) and the protection of 
the processing of personal data (Article 8 ECHR).
Secondly, insofar as other conventions of the CoE have been signed and ratified the impact 
of these treaties on Dutch administrative law appears to be limited if there is an EU counter-
part. This is clearly illustrated by the case study on the CoE Convention for the Protection 
of Individuals with regard to Automatic Data Processing, which seems to have been im-
portant in the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s but has become less relevant since the 
adoption of the Directive 95/ 46/ EC and— very recently— the EU General Data Protection 
Regulation. Indeed, if such counterpart EU legislation is lacking and there is no support in 
case law on the ECHR the impact of the CoE convention is very limited. For example, as was 
also shown above, the European Charter of Local Self- Government has had very limited 
meaning in Dutch case law because, thus far, its provisions have been supposed to be not 
self- executing.
Thirdly, legal instruments of the CoE other than conventions (treaties) have very limited 
impact on the Dutch legal order, in both legislation and in case law, since they have no 
binding status and usually other national or European sources are available that have 
stronger legal force. As far as case law refers to CoE recommendations, which is very rare in 
itself, this seems to happen only if these recommendations can be considered explanations 
or confirmations of some provision of the ECHR. Preferably, the national courts refer to the 
case law of the ECtHR, which has interpreted some provisions of the ECHR with reference 
to a recommendation or other soft law document of the CoE. Thus, the ECHR is the focal 
point for the further development of general principles of administrative law.
In sum, it is not really possible to perceive either a conceptual match or a conceptual mis-
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administration. The wide variety of documents of the CoE containing some (hidden) 
building blocks for the development of general administrative law necessarily entails a 
wide variety of impact mechanisms, ranging from having a direct effect within the Dutch 
legal order to being a mere source of inspiration for Dutch administrative bodies without 
entailing specific legal obligations.
Another effect of the findings of this study is that the provisions of ECHR remain essential 
when it comes to the further development of general principles of administrative law. They 
can either play an autonomous role (since they have direct effect in the Dutch legal order) or 
they can be used indirectly when interpreting domestic general principles of administrative 
law. What is more, some connection with a provision of the ECHR seems to be a necessary 
prerequisite for deriving a general principle of administrative law from the law of the CoE. 
The example of the application by analogy of Protocol No. 7 and the ne bis in idem principle 
showed that this necessary connection even holds when a certain part of the ECHR has not 
been ratified: non- ratified ‘hard law’ may be even stronger than adopted soft law.
This might also be the way along which principles of good administration can evolve into 
principles of administrative law. As soon as the ECtHR adopts an element of good admin-
istration in its case law under the ECHR, e.g. the principle of transparency as a procedural 
obligation under Article 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR,157 it paves the way for the 
adoption of transparency as a general principle of administrative law.
The downside of this strong orientation towards the ECHR is that the general principles of 
administrative law derived from CoE instruments only provide for minimum protection. 
This is clearly illustrated by the case study on access to official documents: although some 
right of access to State- held information can be derived from Article 10 ECHR, the scope 
and content of this right is far more restricted than a right of access to State- held informa-
tion based on the CoE Convention on Access to Official Documents, which has not yet been 
ratified by the Netherlands.
Thus, in answering the central question of to what extent the CoE has provided added value 
for the development of general principles of administrative law and of good administration 
in the Netherlands, it turns out that the influence of the CoE is rather weak in both areas. 
This is different only for the ECHR and sometimes another CoE convention, especially if 
there is no EU law available that regulates the same field. This does not necessarily mean 
that recommendations and other soft law remain completely irrelevant for the Dutch legal 
order. Apart from the source of inspiration that such soft law can be for the legislature it is 
not impossible that soft law might influence debates on legal development. In this respect it 
is worth emphasizing that the relatively new phenomenon of the Advocate- General facili-
tates reflection on the administrative issue at stake going beyond an analysis of ‘hard law’ 
only. Even though previous opinions of Advocates- General do not show such an orienta-
tion they could also take the soft law of the CoE into account. This potential impact of the 
soft law of the CoE holds in particular where new choices in legal development need to be 
made. Thus, instead of waiting for a recommendation to be ultimately codified in a conven-
tion (as has happened with several recommendations in the past) it could still be useful to 






keep an eye not only on case law with regard to the ECHR but also on other CoE documents 
that may be relevant for the development of general administrative law.
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